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Cognitive Effort and Memory 
Sherman W. Tyler, Paula T. Hertel, Marvin C. McCallum, and 
Henry C. Ellis 
University of New Mexico 
We propose that the concept of cognitive effort in memory is both useful and 
important. Cognitive effort is defined as the engaged proportion of limited­
capacity central processing. It·was hypothesized that this variable might have 
important memorial consequences and might also be a potential confounding 
factor .in levels-of-processing paradigms. The first experiment tested this 
possibility using two types of incidental-learning tasks factorially combined 
with two degrees of effort. It was found that high effort led to better recall 
than low effort, but that level-of-processing effects were nonsignificant. A 
second experiment clearly demonstrated the feasibility of using performance 
on a secondary task as an independent criterion for measuring effort, and two 
further experiments ruled out alternative accounts of effort effects. A reliable 
levels-of-processing effect was obtained in the fourth experiment in which the 
incidental-learning tasks were blocked. Implications and possible future ap­
plications of the cognitive effort concept are discussed. 
The concept of cognitive effort can be 
best appreciated by examining it within 
the context of levels-of-processing research. 
The levels-of-processing approach has been 
an especially popular one in recent years, 
both as an impetus to research and as an 
explanatory device for many general find­
ings in memory (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). The original notion was based on 
the premise that a series of analyzers, 
varying along a continuum from structural 
to semantic analysis, is employed in pro­
cessing an i tern for storage in memory ; and 
the greater the depth to which an item is 
processed, the greater the probability it 
will later be recalled. Repeated processing 
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of a word to a given depth was assumed 
not to improve memory beyond the level 
associated with that depth. 
This general view has been under con­
sideraple attack lately. For example, Nelson 
(1977) has argued that there are two major 
problems with this viewpoint. First, it can 
be demonstrated empirically that repeated 
processing of an item to the same depth 
does in fact improve memory relative to 
nonrepeated processing. Second, the notion 
of depth of processing is theoretically vapid, 
since there is no independent measure by 
which to order different processing tasks 
along the depth continuum; the best that 
can be done is divide the available tasks 
into two or three nominal categories using 
rather loose criteria. Baddeley (1978) has 
made similar arguments, adding the point 
that constructs later incorporated into this 
approach, including notions such as com­
patibility and breadth of processing, suffer 
from the same lack of any independent 
measurement criteria. Additional doubts 
about depth have been recently noted by 
Nelson, Walling, and McEvoy (1979) . 
Given this state of affairs, we asked if 
there could be an identifiable factor in 
Copyright 1979 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0096-1515/79/0506-0607$00.75 
607 
608 TYLER, HERTEL, McCALLUM, AND ELLIS 
memory processing, the effects of which 
are directly reflected in recall performance, 
and which can be described as a con­
tinuum accessible to independent measure­
ment. We propose that a reasonable can­
didate is mental or cognitive effort, or 
more explicitly, the amount of the available 
processing capacity of the limited-capacity 
central processor utilized in performing an 
information-processing task. The proce­
dures for measuring effort by evaluating 
the attention-demand characteristics of 
stimuli under various task conditions were 
initially described by Ellis and Kreezer 
(Note 1). Their approach used a method­
ology based on divided attention, in which 
the subject performed a primary motor­
tracking task and a secondary task in­
volving simple reaction time to auditory 
or visual stimuli. The effort concept, more 
formally introduced by Moray (1967) , 
seems particularly suitable in a number 
of ways. Not only has it found considerable 
utility in work such as that of Johnston 
and Uhl (1976), Johnston, Wagstaff, and 
Griffith (1972) , Posner and Snyder (1975), 
Keele (1973) ,  and Kahneman (1973) , but 
it also is susceptible to independent mea­
surement through the use of a secondary 
task, a procedure well reviewed by Kerr 
(1973).  Furthermore, it appears logical to 
assume that the extent of involvement of 
an individual in a cognitive task would 
have a substantial impact on later memorial 
performance. 
The concept of cognitive effort was 
proposed by Ellis (Note 2) as a mechanism 
for accounting for perceptual grouping ef­
fect in recall. In several studies (e.g., Ellis, 
Parente, Grah, & Spiering, 1975; Ellis, 
Parente, & Walker, 1974) , letter strings 
that were variably grouped on successive 
presentations were recalled substantially 
better than letter strings presented in con­
stant fashion. This finding, known as the 
variability effect in recall, is thought to 
be the result of varied input leading to 
greater effort in processing the letter 
strings than constant input. In general, 
recall is substantially greater when sub­
jects reorganize the information rather 
than process it as presented by the ex-
perimenter. Similar findings have been 
reported more recently by Slamecka 
and Graf (1978) and by Jacoby (1978). 
Neither, however, provides evidence in 
support of an effort hypothesis. More 
specifically, Ellis (Note 2) proposed that 
the amount of effort in processing a given 
class of information can vary independently 
of the level at which it is processed. Thus, 
it is possible to process superficial struc­
tural (perceptual) information as well as 
semantic information with varying degrees 
of effort. Accordingly, the degree of cog­
nitive effort is viewed as an alternative 
hypothesis in accounting for several mem­
ory phenomena. 
The possibility that effort, as a factor 
separable from level of processing, can 
produce recall differences has not been 
totally ignored. Walsh and Jenkins (1973) 
did report a series of experiments designed 
to dismiss this possibility. Arguing that 
no independent definition of effort existed, 
they attempted to manipulate effort by 
requiring subjects to perform either one 
or two different incidental tasks on each 
stimulus item, the latter presumably re­
quiring greater effort. Finding, in the two­
task case, that the amount recalled was 
greater for the task requiring a deeper level 
of processing and otherwise did not differ 
from the one-task case, they rejected effort 
as an influential factor. The major problem 
with this study is the confusion of total 
time with momentary effort. Performing 
two tasks does not necessarily require a 
larger amount of central-processing ca­
pacity at a given point in time, especially if 
subjects adopt the strategy of executing 
the task serially, and hence effort may not 
have been effectively manipulated. A simi­
lar criticism applies to Craik and Tulving 
(1975, Experiment 5). It is apparent, then, 
that effort cannot be so lightly disregarded. 
It is the purpose of this research to 
provide a more valid test of effort as a 
causal factor in word recall. To this end, 
four experiments were run. The first was 
designed to determine if experimenter­
defined manipulations of effort within 
single cognitive tasks would indeed affect 
recall. The second attempted to establish 
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an independent measurement criterion for 
the effort continuum. The third and fourth 
experiments were designed to rule out 
possible alternative explanations of effort 
effects; in addition, the fourth employed 
a modification of the earlier designs, 
changed to remove certain anomalies ob­
served in previous results. 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, the standard levels­
of-processing paradigm was employed. Sub­
jects experienced a series of nonsemantic 
(anagram) and semantic (sentence-com­
pletion) tasks, after which they were sur­
prised with a word-recall test. For each 
type of task, there were two different 
degrees of effort, the difference correspond­
ing to a manipulation believed on logical 
grounds to correlate with momentary 
central-processing capacity demands. For 
the anagram task, subjects attempted to 
unscramble a series of letters to determine 
which of two words contained the same 
letters. In the low-effort condition, the 
anagrams were scrambled very little; in 
the high-effort condition, letter rearrange­
ment was extensive. 
For the sentence-completion task, sub­
jects tried to choose which of two presented 
words fit into a blank in a given sentence. 
For low-effort sentences a single word was 
strongly implied, whereas for high-effort 
sentences the best-fitting word was not 
readily apparent. 
The major hypothesis of this study was 
that words encountered during high-effort 
tasks would be better 'recalled than those 
in the low-effort condition. This was an 
obvious derivation for target words (correct 
choices) , and was also extended to dis­
tractor words on the assumption that, 
being . simultaneously presented with the 
target words, they could share in the pro­
cessing effort required by the task. 
Method 
Materials. Eighty nouns of 5-8 letters were 
selected from Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan's (1968) 
norms and were of uniformly high imagery, meaning­
fulness, and frequency values. For each word, four 
task slides containing two anagrams and two sen­
tences were constructed. The anagrams differed in 
terms of the number of letter positions altered from 
those in the source word; this manipulation produced 
low-effort and high-effort anagrams. For example, 
the word doctor was transformed into the anagrams 
dortoc (low effort) and croodt (high effort). For the 
sentence slides, sentences were constructed con­
taining a blank into which the word could meaning­
fully be inserted. The blanks occurred in the same 
position in each sentence, generally at the end, 
and served the same syntactic role in the two 
sentences. The sentences differed only in the degree 
to which each implied the missing word. Thus, 
for low-effort sentences the missing word was 
judged by the experimenters to be almost redundant 
with other information in the sentence: The girl 
was awakened by her frightening --· For high­
effort sentences the missing word was judged to be 
less determined by the information in the sentence: 
The man was alarmed by the frightening --· For 
the above examples, the missing word was dream; 
it has a relatively high probability of being chosen 
for the low-effort sentence and is one of several 
possibilities for the high-effort sentence. For this 
task an attempt was also made to equalize the 
imagery value and salience of the two sentences. 
Target slides were composed of the target word 
and a distractor, one appearing above the other, 
with relative position being counterbalanced so 
that target words occurred in the top position for 
half of the slides. Distractors were chosen to mini­
mize choice errors in the sentence completion task. 
In general, completing the sentence with the dis­
tractor yielded a completely meaningless statement. 
Subjects and design. Sixteen students from in­
troductory psychology classes were assigned separate 
lists. Each list was composed of 40 target-distractor 
pairs. Ten pairs were presented within each task 
condition (low-effort anagram, high-effort anagram, 
low-effort sentence, high-effort sentence). Further­
more, target-distractor positions on the target slide 
were counterbalanced within condition, and list 
order was completely randomized. Therefore, each 
subject saw all 80 words in a unique order. Across 
subjects, each word was presented twice as a target 
(once above the distractor and once below) and 
twice as a distractor in each task condition. 
Procedure. Subjects were run individually in an 
incidental-learning paradigm. They were seated 
before a rear projection screen, with two vertically 
arranged buttons situated on the table in front 
of them. The buttons were labeled top and bottom, 
and there was a resting place for the finger indicated 
between them. Subjects were told at the start of 
the session that they would see a series of slide 
pairs, each pair appearing simultaneously on the 
screen. When an anagram appeared on the task 
slide, the subjects' task was to determine to which 
of two words on the target slide the anagram cor­
responded, and to indicate their choice by pressing 
the corresponding button, top or bottom, with 
their preferred hand. When an incomplete sentence 
appeared on the task slide, the task was to choose 
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Figure 1. Mean percent recall of words chosen as 
correct responses in high- and low-effort anagrams 
and sentence tasks. 
the word that made most sense in the sentence. 
Target slides were presented on the left side of the 
screen, and task slides on the right, both shown 
simultaneously. Subjects were informed that this 
was a reaction-time experiment, although they were 
to be sure of their choice before responding. Each 
trial was preceded by a warning light, and five 
practice trials were given. Finally, a constant 
interval of 9 sec was observed from the onset of 
one slide pair to the onset of the next. 
Following the processing tasks, subjects engaged 
in 30 sec of simple arithmetic and were then asked 
to free recall all words appearing on the target 
slides. Guessing was encouraged by the instructions, 
and all subjects were required to guess at the end 
of their initial recall periods. 
Results and Discussion 
Overall recall. We first examined the 
mean percent word recall using an analysis 
of variance with three within-subject fac­
tors : word type (target vs. distractor) , 
degree of effort, and level of processing. 
In this and all future analyses, values of 
p < .OS were considered significant. More 
words were recalled in the high-effort 
(18.6%) than in the low-effort condition 
(11.1 %), F(1, 15) = 8.50, MS. = 16.93. 
A secondary finding was that recall of 
correctly chosen words was greater than 
recall of distractor words, F(1, 15) = 18.64, 
MS. = 8.38; however, this factor did not 
interact with either of the other two factors. 
Finally, there was no effect of level of 
processing, words in the sentence-comple­
tion task being recalled only slightly better 
than words in the anagram task. 
Target recall. Figure 1 presents the 
mean percent recall of target (correct) 
words in each of the four task conditions. 
A second analysis of variance for the 
effects of effort and level of processing was 
carried out for target words alone. Neither 
the main effects of effort nor levels of 
processing for target words were reliable, 
nor was there any Effort X Level of Pro­
cessing interaction. A separate analysis of 
effort effects within each level of processing 
revealed that high-effort sentence tasks led 
to better recall than low-effort sentence 
task, F(1, 15) = 4.91, MS. = 2.86, al­
though there was no significant effect of 
effort for the anagram task. 
Distractor recall. An analysis of recall 
for distractor words showed a pattern of 
results similar to recall of target words. 
For distractor (nontarget) words, the mean 
percent recall for low- and high-effort 
anagrams was 5.6% and 11.3%, respec­
tively, and 7.5% and 19.4% for low- and 
high-effort sentences, respectively. The 
overall effect of effort on distractor recall 
was significant, F(1, 15) = 10.65, MS. 
= 4.60, whereas there was neither a reli­
able effect of levels of processing nor a 
significant interaction of these two factors. 
Finally, within the sentence-completion 
task, effort had a reliable influence, F(l, 15) 
= 6.45, MS. = 3.49; within the anagram 
task, the effort effect was not reliable. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 provided substantial sup­
port for the role of cognitive effort in 
recall. The major purpose of the second 
experiment was to establish an independent 
measure to assess the effort required for 
a given task, and to use the measure to 
validate the effort manipulation employed 
in the first experiment. In addition, a slight 
modification of the original task was made 
in order to magnify the impact of the 
effort manipulation. It was felt that since 
the effort manipulation was confined to 
the relation between the target word and 
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the task, including a distractor with the 
target might have modified the effort 
actually required for a given task. There­
fore, a change was made from the two­
choice reaction-time task to a simple 
yes-no decision task. 
The logic of this experiment essentially 
follows that presented by Kerr (1973) in 
her review of secondary task paradigms, 
and the specific design used is quite similar 
to that of Ellis and Kreezer (Note 1) and 
Johnston and Uhl (1976). The basic idea 
involves adding a secondary tone-detection 
task to the primary task, the assumption 
being that the greater the proportion of 
the limited-capacity central processor re­
quired for the primary task, the worse the 
performance will be on the secondary task. 
The primary task, as emphasized by in­
structions, was the same for this experi­
ment as the task used in Experiment 1, 
with the exception that instead of choosing 
between two words, subjects simply de­
termined whether a single word was correct 
(i.e., fit in the sentence or could be made 
from the scrambled letters) . At the same 
time subjects performed the prim�,:�,ry task, 
they were required to press anoth�r button 
as quickly as possible whenever tfiey heard 
a tone over their headphones, and reaction 
times for tone detection were recorded. 
Two major predictions were derived from 
effort theory. First, it was expected that 
correct words would in general be more 
frequently recalled if they appeared in the 
high-effort tasks than if they were present 
in low-effort tasks. No predictions were 
made regarding words for which a negative 
response was appropriate, since the effort 
manipulation bore no obvious relationship 
to the incorrect words. Second, measures 
of tone-detection reaction times were ex­
pected to reflect directly the effort needed 
for a given type of task, with high-effort 
tasks showing longer reaction times than 
low-effort tasks. 
Method 
Materials, subjects, and design. Task slides were 
identical to those in Experiment 1; however, target 
slides contained only one word that was either 
the correct word for the task or the incorrect 
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Figure Z. Mean percent recall of words for which 
positive responses were approp.riate, separated ac­
cording to level of processing and effort condition. 
distractor previously paired with the word in 
Experiment 1. Sixteen subjects from introductory 
psychology classes received the same lists of tasks 
as did those in Experiment 1. The new correspond­
ing targets were counterbalanced within task condi­
tion so that half would yield yes responses and half 
would yield no responses. Thus, each subject saw 
40 words, and across subjects each word was 
presented once for a positive response and once for 
a negative response in each task condition. 
Procedure. Subjects were run individually in an 
incidental learning paradigm that included a dis­
junctive reaction-time primary task and a tone­
detection secondary task (probe task). They were 
seated at a table in front of a rear projection 
screen. On one side of the table were two buttons 
labeled yes and no, and on the other was a button 
labeled tone. These could be shifted according to 
the subjects' handedness. The two tasks were then 
described to the subjects. For the primary task, 
the subjects determined whether the target word 
on the left side of the screen could be used to 
complete the task on the right side of the screen, 
that is, whether it could be constructed from 
scrambled letters for anagram task slides or fitted 
in a sentence blank for sentence-completion task 
slides. For the secondary task, they were told that 
on some trials a tone would occur over the left 
earphone. Upon its occurrence, they were to press 
the tone button with their nonpreferred hand and 
continue with the primary task. It was emphasized 
that the primary task was the one of most im­
portance. Probe onset occurred either 500, 1,000, 
1,500, or 2,000 msec following the onset of the 
slide pair, or not at all. The probe was a weak 
1000-Hz tone of approximately 14 dB (SPL).  The 
five probe conditions were counterbalanced within 
task conditions and response (yes, no) conditions. 
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Table 1 
Mean Probe Reaction Times (in msec) 
for Positive and Negative Responses 
Primary task 
condition 
Low-effort anagram 
High-effort anagram 
Low-effort sentence 
High-effort sentence 
Primary task response 
Positive Negative 
1,155 
1,205 
937 
1,225 
1,047 
1, 140 
1,204 
1, 137 
In all other respects, the procedure was identical 
to that of Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Percent recall. Figure 2 presents mean 
percent recall of words for which positive 
responses were appropriate, presented ac­
cording to the type of processing task. As 
in the first experiment, an analysis of 
variance for these words showed that the 
overall effect of effort was significant, 
F(l, 15) = 6.82, MS. = 3.67, and that 
there was no reliable levels-of-processing 
�ffect a�d no Effort X Level of Processing 
mteractwn. Further analysis of the effect 
of effort within each level of processing 
established a substantial effect within sen­
tence-completion tasks, F(l, 15) = 10.90, 
MS. = 1.46, but no reliable effect within 
anagram tasks. 
Percent recall for negative responses was 
much lower than for positive responses 
(10.0% and 7.5% for low- and high-effort 
anagrams, and 23.8% and 27.5% for low­
and high-effort sentences). As revealed by 
an analysis of variance, effort was not a 
reliable factor in accounting for negative­
response recall, although there was an 
effect of level of processing for negative 
responses, F(1, 15) = 15.73, MS. = 2.89. 
Probe reaction time. Table 1 reports 
mean probe response latencies for both 
positive and negative responses in the 
primary processing task. The means repre­
sent response times for all four probe onset 
latencies and exclude response times to 
probes occurring after the response to the 
primary task was executed. (A preliminary 
analysis determined that there were no 
differential effects due to time of probe 
onset.) The most important finding was 
that effort differences in reaction time cor­
responded to effort differences in percent 
recall. An analysis of variance applied to 
probe latencies for positive primary-task 
responses established that such responses 
were longer during the high-effort pro­
cessing tasks, F(l, 15) = 5.41, MS. = .40. 
Differences in probe reaction time across 
levels of processing were not reliable, nor 
wa� the E�o�t X Level of Processing inter­
actiOn. W1thm tasks, probe latencies were 
longer for the high-effort sentence-comple­
tion task than for the low-effort sentence 
task, F(1, 15) = 15.00, MS. = .09, but 
t�ere was no such effect for anagrams. 
Fmally, no reliable effects of either effort 
or level of processing were obtained for 
negative responses in the processing task. 
Several points deserve emphasis. First, 
the use of a secondary task to provide an 
independent measure of effort was shown 
to be successful. The pattern of significant 
effort effects for both positive and negative 
responses in recall performance was mir­
rored exactly in the probe reaction-time 
data, even extending to effects within each 
task. 
_
AI�o, it is noteworthy that in spite 
of a s1gmficant level-of-processing effect for 
the recall of negative response words, there 
was no such effect for probe reaction 
time�. T�is clearly indicates that probe 
react10n-t1me performance does measure 
something separate from and independent 
of depth of processing. 
The second point to be made is that 
the manipula�ions used to vary effort, 
based on a log1cal rather than an empirical 
approach, were generally successful and 
were enhanced by using a simple reaction­
time task instead of a two-choice task. 
Apparently, the required central-processing 
capacity was indeed being manipulated. 
The last point relates to the lack of a 
significant level-of-processing effect in the 
first experiment. It is possible that as­
suming the overriding importance of effort 
this outcome might have been due to a� 
absence of any difference in effort between 
these particular nonsemantic and semantic 
tasks. This speculation is supported by the 
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reaction-time data of this second study, 
which essentially show no overall difference 
between the two levels of processing. An 
alternative explanation will be considered 
in the fourth experiment. 
Experiment 3 
There is an alternative account of the 
findings of the preceding experiments de­
monstrating effort effects, namely, that 
the determining factor is not the difference 
due to variations in momentary effort, 
rather it is the total time required for 
each task that affects recall. High-effort 
tasks may simply take longer to perform 
than low-effort tasks, and this alone may 
lead to better recall. Unfortunately, more 
is needed to assess this possibility than 
simply looking at reaction times for the 
primary task. This is so because total 
reaction time includes the time required 
to read the task slide, and the latter un­
doubtedly differs for the different task 
conditions. Thus, it almost certainly takes 
longer for the average subject to read a 
sentence than to read a near word (i.e., 
anagram); similarly, an anagram in the 
high-effort condition, being less like a real 
word, may well take longer to read than 
one in the low-effort condition. The de­
pendent variable needed to rule out the 
total time explanation is one that corrects 
total reaction times for differences in 
reading times. The purpose of this experi­
ment was to obtain an estimate of this 
dependent variable by separately assessing 
the total reaction time and the task 
reading time for the same subject on each 
task, and then analyzing the differences 
between task conditions using the resultant 
adjusted dependent variable. 
Method 
Materials, subjects, and design. Sixteen .s';lbiects from introductory psychology courses partiCipated, 
each being assigned a different list of task and 
target items. Specific tasks and targets, as well �s 
specific orders, were identical to those used m 
Experiment 2. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two 
phases the first to assess task reaction times and 
the se�ond to evaluate task reading times. The 
two phases were conducted 2 days apart in order 
to minimize possible transfer effects, and subjects 
were run individually. The first phase consisted of 
a series of yes-no decision tasks identical to those 
used in the incidental learning phase of Experi­
ment 2. The instructions and general setup of 
equipment were also identical. Following the first 
phase, each subject was instructed to return 2 days 
later for another session and was then dismissed. 
In the second phase, the subjects were told that 
they would now see the same task slides as had 
been seen in the first session, but without any 
associated target slides. The task was simply to 
read each task slide, then press the top button 
used for yes responses as soon as the reading of 
the slide was completed. Each subject was then 
shown the 40 task slides, and reading times were 
recorded. 
Results and Discussion 
A new dependent variable, decision time, 
was computed by subtracting the reading 
time for each task from the corresponding 
reaction time to perform that task with 
a given target item. This was done sepa­
rately for each subject, thereby producing 
a new set of 40 decision times for each. 
Decision time thus reflected the time needed 
to determine the appropriate response for 
a given task-target pairing, with the time 
required for reading the task removed. 
The mean decision times for correct yes 
decisions were as follows: for low-effort 
anagrams, 2,018 msec; for low-effort sen­
tences, 1,287 msec; for high-effort ana­
grams, 1, 7 58 msec; and for high-effort 
sentences, 1,563 msec. An analysis of vari­
ance verified that the effect of effort was 
nonsignificant, although there was a level­
of-processing effect, anagram tasks re­
quiring longer to perform than sentence­
completion tasks, F(1, 15) = 14.17. MS. 
= .96. There was no interaction of these 
two factors. Though uninformative, a simi­
lar analysis of correct no decisions showed 
an absence of any reliable effects of level 
of processing or of effort. 
It appears, then, that effort effects 
cannot be readily accounted for by an 
appeal to the total time hypothesis. When 
reaction times are corrected for reading 
time variations, there is virtually no dif­
ference between low-effort and high-effort 
tasks. 
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Experiment 4 
There were two main reasons for con­
ducting the final experiment. The first was 
to demonstrate further the inadequacy of 
the total-time explanation of the obtained 
effort effects, and the second was to re­
move two anomalies encountered in pre­
vious experiments. 
The first goal was achieved by changing 
the nature of the task from one in which 
both target and task slide were presented 
simultaneously and remained present 
throughout task execution, to one in which 
the target slide was presented only briefly 
and appeared prior to the task slide. By 
making this change, any possibility that 
effort effects were arising due to greater 
time spent by subjects on the physically 
present target slide during high-effort tasks 
could be eliminated. 
To explain how the second goal was 
achieved, the two anomalies observed in 
the earlier experiments need to be specified. 
One anomaly centers on the consistent 
failure to obtain a reliable effort effect for 
the anagram task alone, despite the fact 
that this was obtained for the sentence­
completion task in both of the first two 
experiments and despite the presence in 
the second experiment of an overall effect 
of effort. A second anomaly concerns the 
failure in each of the preceding studies to 
obtain a reliable level-of-processing effect 
for correct positive responses. 
The first anomaly may have been due 
to the fact that the target item was 
physically present throughout the task. 
Thus, in the anagram task, subjects may 
simply have scanned back and forth be­
tween target and task slides directly com­
paring letters, and the effect of differences 
in degree of letter rearrangement may 
thereby have been much reduced. It was 
hoped, therefore, that the previously men­
tioned change in tris experiment from 
simultaneous to succ'essive presentation of 
target-task slide pairs would result in the 
attainment of an effort effect for anagrams. 
The second anomaly, lack of level-of­
processing effects, may have been due to 
the intermixing of anagram and sentence­
completion tasks. Given that the nature 
of the task was never known in advance 
and that subjects were instructed to read 
the target slide first, all words may have 
been processed to a fairly deep level, 
whether appearing in an anagram or a 
sentence-completion task. To reduce this 
difficulty, the paradigm was further modi­
fied. Sentence-completion and anagram 
tasks were blocked 5o that a number of 
tasks of the same type occurred for a series 
of trials, and subjects were informed in 
advance of the type of task that would 
occur within each given block. It was 
anticipated that as a result of these 
changes, subjects would be more inclined 
to process the target item only to the 
depth required by the task. 
Method 
Materials, subjects, and design. Subjects were 
32 volunteers from introductory psychology courses. 
The specific target and task slides used were essen­
tially the same as those employed in Experiment 2. 
However, slides were arranged for a given subject 
so that there was a series of sentence-completion 
tasks followed by a series of anagram tasks, and 
vice-versa, composing a total of four blocks. In 
addition, five trials at the beginning of the experi­
ment were treated as practice trials, as was the 
first trial of each new block, and target items 
that were recalled later from these trials were not 
scored. Furthermore, a color slide was used to 
signal the nature of the task to be performed 
within the upcoming block of trials: A blue slide 
meant the tasks would all involve anagrams, a red 
slide signaled the sentence-completion task, and 
a yellow slide at the end of the entire series of 
slides meant that the primary task was no longer 
in effect and only probe detection would be neces­
sary for the remainder of the trials. 
For half of the subjects, the first and t)lird 
blocks consisted of anagram tasks, the second and 
fourth of sentence-completion tasks; for the other 
half, this order was reversed. Across subjects, each 
word appeared in each block in each task condi­
tion, and in each of these conditions the response 
of yes was appropriate for half of the subjects 
and the response of no for the other half. Each 
subject, therefore, experienced a unique ordering 
of task and target slides. There was a total of 
40 slide pairs, excluding practice slides, shown to 
each subject. Thus a typical series of slides might 
be blue slide, 15 anagram tasks (including five 
practice trials); red slide, 11 sentence-completion 
tasks (including one practice trial); blue slide, 
11 anagram tasks; red slide, 11 sentence-completion 
tasks; yellow slide. 
Procedure. The equipment setup was the same 
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as in Experiment 2, as were the primary and 
secondary tasks. Subjects were informed of the 
nature of the primary task and were further in­
structed that a given type of task would occur for 
a number of trials, the nature of that task being 
signaled by a preceding color slide. Which color 
signaled which task was fully explained until sub­
jects said they clearly understood the relationship. 
Subjects were then told about the tone-detection 
task and were instructed to press the appropriate 
button whenever a tone was heard over the head­
phones. It was stressed that they should do this 
as quickly as possible, although it was most im­
portant that they do well on the primary task. 
Subjects were then shown all target-task slide 
pairs. The tone, as in Experiment 2, occurred 
either 500, 1,000, 1,500, or 2,000 msec after task 
slide onset, or not at all; for each type of task, 
there was an equal number of probes at each onset 
time. Following the appearance of the yellow slide 
at the end of the entire series of slide pairs, five 
trials of tone detection alone were administered 
in order to reduce recency effects in recall. Finally, 
subjects were asked to recall as many of the words 
seen during the primary task as they could re­
member. Guessing was encouraged, and subjects 
were required to produce at least 20 words. 
Results and Discussion 
Percent recall. Figure 3 shows the mean 
percent recall of words for which positive 
responses were appropriate, divided ac­
cording to specific task condition. For these 
words, an analysis of variance revealed 
main effects of both effort, F(1, 31) 
= 28.97, MS. = 2.18, and level of pro-
Figure 3. Mean percent recall of words for which 
positive responses were appropriate, separated by 
level of processing and effort condition. 
Table 2 
Mean Probe Reaction Times (in msec) for 
Positive and Negative Responses 
Primary task 
condition 
Low-effort anagram 
High-effort anagram 
Low-effort sentence 
High-effort sentence 
Primary task response 
Positive 
745 
953 
791 
1,127 
Negative 
747 
749 
831 
856 
cessing, F(1, 31) = 5.24, MS. = 3. 73, with 
no interaction of these two factors. A fur­
ther analysis of effort effects within each 
level of processing established reliable 
effects for both sentences, F (1, 31) = 9.62, 
MS. = 1.87, and anagrams, F(1, 31) = 
9.89, MS. = 1.39. 
Words for which negative responses were 
appropriate only showed a significant level 
of processing effect, F(1, 31) = 11.33, MS. 
= 3.38. There was no effort effect and no 
reliable interaction for these words. 
Probe reaction time. All probes that 
appeared after the subject responded to 
the primary task were eliminated from the 
analysis. As in Experiment 2, there was no 
effect of time of probe onset, so all probe 
reaction times were combined within each 
task condition. Separate analyses of vari­
ance were performed for positive and 
negative responses. Table 2 presents the 
mean probe response latencies for both 
positive and negative responses, divided 
according to primary task condition. For 
positive responses, probe latencies were 
longer in the high-effort than in the low­
effort primary tasks, F(1, 31) = 19.79, 
MS. = .48. There were no differences in 
probe latencies for different levels of pro­
cessing, nor was there any interaction. 
Within each level of processing, effort had 
a reliable influence: for anagrams, F(l, 31) 
= 18.83, MS. = .07; for sentences, F(l, 31) 
= 11.34, MS. = .32. For negative re­
sponses there were no reliable effects of 
effort or level of processing, nor was there 
an interaction of these factors. 
Thus, the adjustments made in this ex­
periment did eliminate the anomalies ob­
served in the earlier studies. Word recall 
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for items appearing in positive response 
tasks was not only higher for high-effort 
tasks generally, but was also reliably higher 
for high-effort anagrams than for low­
effort anagrams and for high-effort sen­
tences over low-eftort sentences when these 
effects were looked at separately. A sub­
stantial level-of-processing effect was also 
obtained for positive as well as negative 
response items in this experiment. 
Furthermore, the adequacy of probe 
response times as an index of cognitive 
effort once more received substantial jus­
tification. Not only were probe response 
latencies for positive response items longer 
in the high-effort conditions taken as a 
whole, but as in word recall, they were 
also longer for high-effort anagrams and 
for high-effort sentences when separately 
compared to their low-effort counterparts. 
Also, there were no probe reaction-time 
differences between anagram and sentence­
completion tasks for either negative or 
positive responses, despite the fact that 
there were level of processing effects evi­
dent in word recall for both types of 
response. This once again points to the 
independence of cognitive effort from the 
depth of processing notion. 
General Discussion 
The major conclusions from this re­
search are threefold: (a) Effort can be 
orthogonally varied within different levels 
of processing; (b) the amount of effort 
. required by a task is an important de­
terminant of later recall performance, with 
greater effort leading to greater recall; 
(c) there is available an independent, sen­
sitive measurement criterion of effort, 
namely, secondary task performance, and 
this metric measures something separate 
from the level of processing involved. The 
viability of the cognitive effort concept as 
an explanatory factor in memory research, 
as well as its relative advantage over the 
levels-of-processing view, given its suscep­
tibility to precise quantitative specifica­
tion, has thus been supported. 
Several questions warranting further in­
vestigation are suggested by these conclu-
sions, only two of which are mentioned. 
One concerns determination of which 
manipulations of task requirements and 
specific stimulus attributes correspond to 
manipulations of effort. This determina­
tion can, of course, be simply made through 
a strict empirical approach, that is, by 
evaluating the effects of various manipula­
tions on secondary task performance, as­
suming a secondary task of sufficient sen­
sitivity. A taxonomy of those stimulus and 
task dimensions closely tied to the effort 
continuum would potentially be of con­
siderable theoretical interest, since such 
dimensions would presumably correspond 
to the factors of importance in predicting 
memorial performance. 
A second question pertains to the mecha­
nism whereby differences in effort lead to 
differences in recalL It could be that with 
greater effort, there is a greater tendency 
to integrate the context (or task environ­
ment) and the target word, thereby fa­
cilitating later retrieval, or it might be the 
case that an item in a higher effort situation 
is stored in memory as a trace of greater 
strength. A number of techniques could be 
used to assess these various possibilities. 
These might include the use of memory 
paradigms other than free recall to de­
termine the relative importance of re­
trieval operations and the addition of an 
intentionality dimension, that is, varying 
whether subjects are informed of the final 
memory test, to evaluate the extent to 
which effort is under voluntary control. 
Certainly, the experiments reported here 
raise numerous questions deserving further 
investigative consideration. It is hoped 
that the cognitive effort concept will pro­
vide a framework for such investigations 
that lacks some of the shortcomings evi­
dent in the depth-of-processing approach. 
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